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From the Separateness of Space to the Ideality of Sensation. Thou hts on the Possibilities 
of Actuaüzing Hegel's Philosophy of Nature 
Dieter Wandschneider 
Abstract 
The Cartesian concept of nature, which has determined modem thinking until the present time, 
has become obsolete. It shall be shown that Hegel's objective-idealistic conception of nature 
discloses, in comparison to that of Descartes, new perspectives for the comprehension of nature 
and that this, in turn, results in possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. 
If the argumentation conceming philosophy of nature is intended to catch up with the 
concrete Being-of-nature and to meet it in its concretion, then this is impossible for the finite 
spint in a strictly a pnon sense - this is the thesis supported here which is not at all close to 
Hegel. As the argumentation rather has to consider the conditions of realization conceming the 
Being-of-nature, too, it is compelled to take up ernpirical elements - conceming the organism, 
for instance, system-theoretical aspects, physical and chernical features of the nervous System, 
etc. With that, on the one hand, empirical-scientific premises are assumed (e.g. the lawlikeness 
of nature), which on the other hand become (now close to Hegel) possibly able to be founded in 
the frame of a Hegelian-idealistic conception. in this sense, a double strategy of empirical- 
scientific concretization and objective-idealistic foundation is followed up, which represents the 
methodical basicprinciple of the developed considerations. 
in the Course of the undertaking, the main aspects of the whole Hegelian design 
conceming the philosophy of nature are considered - space and time, mass and motion, force 
and law of nature, the organism, the problem of evolution, psychic being - as well as Hegel's 
basic thesis conceming the philosophy of nature, that therein a tendency towarai coherence and 
idealizuiion manifests itself in the sense of a (categoncally) gradually nsing succession of 
nature: from the separateness of space to the ideality of sensation. in the sense of the double 
strategy of concretization and foundation it is shown that on the one hand possibilities of 
philosophical penetration conceming actual empirical-scientific results are opened, and on the 
other hand - in turn - a re-interpretation of Hegel's theorem on the basis of physical, 
evolution-theoretical and system-theoretical argumentation also becomes possible. in this 
mutual crossing-over and elucidation of empirical and Hegelian argumentation not only do 
perspectives of a new comprehension of nature become visible, but also, at the Same time - as 
an essential consequence of this methodical pnnciple - thoughts on the possibilities of 
actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. 
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1. Introduction 
The Cartesian concept of nature, which has determined modern thought up to the present, has 
become obsolete. For us nature is more than just pure extension,' in which, as Leibniz had 
3 
already pointed out, not even the central physical phenomenon of force could be discovered. 
Accordingly, natural science in its actual development - if not in its self-awareness - has 
dissociated itself more and more from Descartes' concept of nature. Even the old rnind-body- 
problem, which for centuries was aporetically bound in the corset of Cartesian mind-body- 
dualism, could not remain unaffected by the Progress of scientific knowledge and has been given 
new impetus. The need for a new, non-Cartesian concept of nature has thereby resulted. The 
philosophy of the present has not been able to satisfy this demand so far. By allowing the 
philosophy of nature to be displiced by the philosophy of science, it has failed to develop a 
contemporary concept of nature. 
In this Situation it is surely obvious that we must also look into the past to see to what 
extent traditional philosophical thought can be utilized. in this sense the following investigation 
links up with Hegel's objective-idealistic concept of nature. The opinion that this is obsolete, 
useless and eccentric has long been ~ u ~ e r s e d e d . ~  Doubtless, details are antiquated - in what 
histoncal text is this not the case? - but in the following we are concemed more with basic 
principles in Hegel's thought and its consequences for a new, non-Cartesian concept of nature. 
It is decisive that such a conception can be argumentatively developed in a consistent 
manner. Hegel's own argumentation in his Philosophy of Nature, i.e., in the framework of an 
'encyclopedic' presentation of his philosophical conception, is actually so short that it must be 
're-created' or reconstructed by interpretation. For the realization of this project I have first 
some preliminary remarks: What Hegel hirnself intends is a comprehending cognition of the 
5 Being-of-nature, which as such is "not an appeal to experience" (9.15); what is meant is an a 
pnon-dialecticai philosophy of nature. in the present context this a prion aspect can only be 
intimated in many cases because of the principal difficulty, that a theory of the dialectic of the 
6 philosophy of nature has not been available so far. On the other hand, the a priori pretension 
may not have tobe maintained strictly at all in so far as the natural-philosophical argurnentation 
in certain points, as it seems, will in pnnciple not manage without empirical elements. With 
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regard to Hegel's a pnon demand, this conjecture - its legitimacy has to be examined - is 
unquestionably quite initating. Here for the moment some bnef comments about that: 
in this context, I think, it is essential that the re-constmctive interpretation mentioned 
must at last also consider conditions of realization concerning the Being-of-nature and is thereby 
necessarily dependent on empincal-scientific facts. If an organism, for instance, is to be 
understood as a real system in a real environment system-theoretical aspects must also be 
considered, or, on the animal level, basic physiological facts about neural organisation and 
sensual perception, too. Such empincal borrowings are indeed unavoidable if we are to clarify 
under what concrete empirical conditions something like 'self-presewation' can be realized in 
an empirical w o r ~ d . ~  Perhaps it is not at all entirely erroneous to assume that such matter could 
be fundarnentally denvable in an a prion sense, too. But it appears to me that, under the 
conditions offinite spirit, the argumentation concerning philosophy of nature requires essentially 
empirical corpcretization. 
To be sure: By accepting empirical elements, the argumentation can no longer clairn 
absolute a pnon stringency but in this respect only probability. This actually contradicts Hegel's 
intention of 'comprehending cognition' (even if he speaks of the fact that "matter ... proves 
itself to be obstinate against the unity of the idea" (9.539 arid.) and, therefore, "contingency . . . 
has its nght in the sphere of nature" (9.34)). Yet this loss of a pnon stringency is compensated 
for by a gain of concretion. The object of philosophy of nature is precisely the concrete Being- 
of-nature. The argumentation of philosophy of nature must catch up with this concrete being and 
meet it in its concretion. Besides, this agrees with Hegel's demand for 'concrete thinking' (even 
if Hegel himself certainly did not have the reversion to empincal facts in mind). in this way the 
inclusion of empincal aspects may be considered as not only acceptable but even unavoidable in 
natural-philosophical contexts - but, of Course, only then when the subject itself demands it. 
This form of empincal concretization also appears to be an actualization of Hegel's 
argumentation by proving itself to have an affinity with the actual science of nature. 
One more thing: With the inclusion of empincal-scientific argurnents the presumptions 
contained in thern are also adopted, which on their part, however, must first be philosophically 
clarified and legitimized. This philosophically seemingly critical state t m s  directly into an 
advantage, however, when it becomes evident that those presumptions especially can be founded 
on the basis of Hegel's conception. To take an example: Every theory of evolution presumes that 
nature does not amount to nothing more than its factual being but contains possibility. But this is 
only justifiable within the framework of an objective-idealistic ontology of nature, for which, in 
turn, this also means the possibility of actualization. 
In this way possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature in the sense of a 
mutual illurnination of empincal-scientific and objective-idealistic arguments are imaginable in 
pnnciple: on the one hand, in the empirical-scientific concretization of arguments given by 
Hege1 and, on the other hand, through the objective-idealistic founding of empirical-scientific 
argumentation. This double strategy of concretization and foundation will prove itself, as a 
methodical basic principle, to be very fruitful in the following. So much for methodological 
aspects; now it is time to face the content. 
Hegel's general determination of nature at this point will be presented only bnefly:' 
According to the law of dialectics, to the Logical-ideal, which is demonstrable as unconditional, 
there also belongs its opposite, the Non-ideal, which for Hegel is nature itself - as an etemal 
accompaning phenomenon of the LogicaL9 If the Ideal is charactenzed by conceptual 
interrelation, then the Non-ideal, that is nature, is determined as separateness. However, as the 
Non-ideal it remains dialectically connected to the Ideal; in other words: Nature is not the 
Logical-ideal but the Logical-ideal underlies it. Separateness is the manner in which the Being- 
of-nature appears, but the essence that underlies it is the Logical-ideal, through which it remains 
implicitly determined. This discrepancy between appearance and essence is characteristic of the 
Being-of-nature, according to Hegel. 
From this a basic feature of the Being-of-nature becomes clear: While its appearance and 
essence are not congruent with one another, it is determined by a tension, which, according to 
Hegel, expresses itself in the tendency to overcome this Iack of congruence and which means 
that there is a wend in the appearance to adapt itself to the underlying ideal essence of nature. 
Thus nature shows, according to Hegel, a tendency towards coherence, towards the negation of 
separateness up to the point of the idealify of the Logical underlying it: Accordingly, Ideality is 
to be understood as the immanent telos of nature, which, however, is only approximately 
attainable by the latter. 
At this point and in the following it must be obsewed that Hegel certainly does not 
understand this in the sense of a natural process but categorially, i.e., as a basic charactenstic of 
the conceptual development not of nature, but of the categories of nature and thus of the 
argumentation ofphilosophy of nature rather than a temporally-real evolutionary process, whose 
assumption Hegel considered by the way to be false (although Statements can sometimes be 
10 found that could suggest such an interpretation). 
This view, according to which the Being-of-nature (under a categorial aspect, as has 
been stated) shows the tendency toward the negation of separateness in the sense of a return to 
the Ideal - a doubtless highly speculative interpretation of nature - constitutes, as regards 
content, the basic thesis of the following investigation, i.e., on the one hand, it is to be shown 
that and how such a tendency towardr coherence und idealization is charactenstic of the Being- 
of-nature and, on the other hand, that from this perspective an i n r e d  connection of natural 
phenornena results - from the elementary separateness to the ideality of psychic being in 
nature. Nature would no longer be, as with Descartes, the strict opposite of the psychic but 
would include its very possibility - a completely non-Cartesian image of nature that without a 
doubt desewes attention in view of our contemporary problems with nature. The following deals 
mainly with this overall perspective of naiure that has to be developed in the light of Hegel's 
thought and the methodical double strategy already charactenzed of empincal concretization and 
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idealistic foundation, which in its double structure, as already expounded, itself brings forth 
possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. 
2. Space and Time 
The first determination of nature in Hegel's sense is pure and still completely undetennined 
separateness. Even at this stage its immanent tendency to negate itself and form coherent 
structures is recognizable, more precisely: The category of separateness forces the introduction 
of further categories, which are of ncher structure. However, Hegel's argumentation conceming 
the development of the category of separateness is extremely short and, therefore, needs to be 
interpreted to a great extent. I have presented an interpretation conceming this matter in another 
11 investigation. Here I will confine myself to making Hegel's respective intention visible: 
According to the law of dialectics, the category of non-separateness also belongs to the category 
of separateness and is understood as the determinate negation (in the specific Hegelian sense) of 
separateness, and that is the category of the point. The unfolding of its dialectic leads via the 
determination of the line and surface to that of the ultimate spatial element, i.e., a space confined 
by surfaces. in this threefold development Hegel sees the result of the 'concept' underlying 
nature and of its three 'moments' - singulaxity, particularity, universality - and therein at the 
12 
same time an argument for the three dimensionality of natural space. Hegel's argumentation 
leads further to the category of time and its characteristic structure of past, present, and future. 
Above all, it is important that this argumentation - presupposing its stringency - at the 
same time makes clear how coherency correlations in the sense of a space-time-structure of the 
Being-of-nature are derived from the supposition of a completely amorphous separateness. This 
concems, on the one hand, the dimensional relationships of space and time and, on the other 
hand, the essential unity of space and time. Naturally, spatial juxtaposition, as well as temporal 
succession, always has the character of separateness, but yet precisely a structured and, because 
of that, already coherent separateness. Such stmctures are, e.g., the object of mathematics when, 
say, it asks about the conditions that are fulfilled by the points of a surface. In a certain sense the 
relation between temporally successive states is even closer in so far as the earlier state produces 
(in a certain sense) the later one. The irrevocable connection between space and time is 
expressed in the end in the fact that not only the place but also the point of time is important for 
the determination of an event: For fundamental coherences of this kind, which are charactenstic 
of the spatial-temporal separateness of nature, Hegel's argumentation offers an interesting 
approach towards an explanation. 
3. Motion and Mass, Relative and Absolute Motion 
On the basis of such fundamental coherence relationships of separateness more specific 
connections then also become possible. Expressed more concretely: According to Hegel, with 
the categones of space and time the categones of motion und rest and - at first perhaps 
surprisingly - that of mass are involved I shall at this point give only a short sumrnas, of 
90 
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Hegel's argumentation (cf 9.55ff). or rather a reconsuuctive interpretation of the same:13 The 
explication of the connection between space and time, which is at first only implicit, compels the 
introduction of the category of motion. Now motion only makes sense relative to a motionless 
state, i.e., with the category of motion that of rest is also always implied. However, something 
can only be at rest that is presewed identically in motion and thereby defines a definite single 
place as a point of reference of motion. Such a Singular, which is identically preserved in 
motion is then, according to Hegel, muss. The 'logic' of the concept of motion in this sense 
demands the category of mass: mass as a Singular identically preserving itself, whereby 'place' 
is realized as the necessary point of reference for motion, which as such represents non-motion 
or 'rest'. 
Now, a mass itself can naturally be moved relative to another mass. In this case the 
relation of motion is symrnetrical: Each can equally be looked upon as moved or as at rest. But 
with that, aprinciple of the relativity of motion is formulated which says in this form: the motion 
of muss is equivalent to relative motion. 
Now, this connection irnmediately has the remarkable consequence that the motion of a 
non-mass is non-relative motion. Such motion indeed refers to a mass, but being non-relative it 
is independent of the respective instance of reference and, therefore, refers to every mass in the 
same way. In other words: A non-relative motion has the same velocity in reference to every 
mass. Besides, such a non-mass can itself - in accordance with its concept - not be at rest but 
be only moved - a very Strange phenomenon, which, however, is empincally realized in the 
fom of the motion of light. 
But what is meant by a non-mass? Hegel has given reasons for the fact that something 
like this must exist in nature and identified it with light and, in fact, attributed an absolute (thus 
non-relative) character to its motion. (9.111f add.). As already mentioned, this is empirically 
comct for light and is the circumstance which led Einstein to develop his (Special) Theory of 
Relativity. It would naturally be absurd to maintain that Hegel anticipated Einstein's theory, 
because this is, above all, a complex mathematical theory, whose very achievement consists in 
the fact that it has shown the mathematical compatibility of relative and non-relative motion. 
Yet, following Hegel, the basic thoughts of relativity theory can be actually gained from the 
'logic' of the concept of motion. 
At this point impressive possibilities of actualizing the Hegelian type of argumentation 
(to express myself quite generally) in the philosophy of nature become visible with a remarkable 
explanatory power in the sense of a philosophy of modern physics: The thoughts developed are 
to be seen as a contribution to a philosophical penetration of the theory of relativity which have 
14 
not been achieved in the otherwise extraordinaxily sophisticated analyses of E. Cassirer and H. 
I5 Reichenbach. In this manner it has been shown that a non-relative motion does not only not 
contradict the pnnciple of the relativity of motion but is, indeed, an implication of the same: 
This is a necessary, non-trivial consequence of the philosophical interpretation of the pnnciple 
of relativity presented here. 
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And furthermore: The fact that light possesses the same state of motion relative to every 
mass also means, vice versa, that the singular and, therefore, different masses are identical to 
each other in this respect. In other words: In the phenomenon of the motion of light the inner 
essential identify of masses now appears explicitly and, in fact, independent of their quantity, 
and their diversity, which is founded in their singularity, thus proves itself to be an aspect of 
their exteriority. 
4. Dynamic Concepts 
On the basis of the category of mass, following Hegel, we further attain dynamic concepts: 
According to the pnnciple of the relativity of motion, a mass can be observed as either at rest, 
namely, in reference to itself, or as moved, namely, in reference to another mass (that is moving 
relative to it). Thus, in principle, a mass can be both at rest or moved. It is, therefore, so Hegel, 
"indifferent to both" and in this sense inert: "In so far as it is at rest, it rests and does not begin 
to move by itself; if it is in motion, then it is simply in motion and does not begin to rest by 
itself' (9.65 add.). 
Now, with the collision of two masses this leads to the following situation: Together they 
both constitute thereby "momentarily ... one body" (66); "as soon as they touch each other they 
are set in one". Since, however, both have different states of motion, this is at the same time, 
metaphorically speaking, "the fight for one place" (9.67 add.). Thus, this 'interaction' of masses 
is characterized by states of motion which are opposed to each other: one at rest and the other as 
moved, respectively. Such an opposite state of motion in itself can now no longer be 
kinematically comprehensible (for that would mean: either at rest or moved, according to the 
instance of reference) and thereby possesses a new kind of structure to be characterized as 
dynamic - 'dynamic' in so far as something like resistance, change of motion and thus 
deviation fmm the inertial behaviour of the masses is involved with it. Physics has introduced 
for this the concepts of 'force', 'energy', 'momentum' etc. 
16 
As Hegel emphasizes, the dynamic is a potentiality existing in mass or matter "as the 
very essence of matter, an essence which itself, at the same time, belongs to matter's 
inwardness; therefore, physics passes over to the Reflection-idea of force" (9.68 add.). Indeed, 
this transition from purely kinematic to dynamic concepts is also compelled - a fact only 
suggested here - by the character of singularity and thereby the diversify of masses, which in 
this way can also possess different states of motion, so that their 'interaction', as explained, can 
no longer be comprehended in a purely kinematic manner. 
At this point the physical concept of a 'field of force' could, indeed, find its place. Today 
it is understood as a system of 'field particles', which can transrnit energy and momentum 
through interaction and thereby exert force effects. On the one hand, the aspect of interacting 
particles is essential here and, on the other hand, that of a spatial-temporal system of such 
interactions in the sense of a 'field' (which will be explained at once). With Hegel himself the 
concept of a force field occurs in connection with gravity in its content (if not in its 
92 
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terminology). An important point emphasized by Hegel here is that the body "qua body ... is 
inseparably connected with its gravity" (9.69). In the language of modern physics one would say 
that the gravitational field is 'coupled' to the mass; this is to be understood, so to speak, as the 
'source' of the field. The field is bound to the source with which it forms a system - thus, a 
form of coherence of dynamic states which, at the same time, represents a new level of negation 
of the separateness of nature. In this sense Hegel interprets especially gravity appearing as the 
attraction between masses: This striving for the negation of separateness is the "first tme 
inwardness" in nature (9.72 add., also 63 add.). 
From the essential coupling of the field of force to its source a further consequence 
results: Space- and time-concepts have a supeficial-contingent character for the field of force. 
That means now, too, that this is invariant, i. e., independent, e. g., of displacement in space and 
time. As mathematical physics shows, dynamic quantities, e.g., the total momentum or total 
energy of a system temporally conserved in such operations, correspond to such invariances. 
The occurence of such conservation quantities can be interpreted in a way that the identiry of the 
dynarnic system, as it were, appears explicitly therein - as a system with this total energy and 
this total momentum etc. in the multiplicity and diversity of the field states the system represents 
in this manner, as already noticed, not only a form of coherence but also essentially an identity 
comprehending the multiplicity and, in this stronger sense, uniry. 
The independence of a dynarnic system from its positioning in space and time 
(mathematically its invhance according spatial-temporal displacements and rotations) means, 
furthermore, that the (isolated) system always and everywhere acts the same way. in other 
words: Its behaviour shows a lawlike character. Under a dynamic aspect, therefore, the concept 
of a universal natural law is implied, which as such is independent of space and time. According 
to the objective-idealistic view, nothing other than the basic logic underlying the Being-of- 
nature becomes visible therein, which as such can, of Course, be comprehended only by thought. 
On the side of real natural appearance this comsponds, as said, to a behaviour of dynamic 
Systems, which is invariant in a spatial-temporal respect, or, formulated more generally, to 
something like constancy or uniformify of nature. 
The universal law of nature as an expression of the logic underlying nature, or the 
constancy of nature as its real appehng: Both are the expression of a much stronger form of the 
negation of nature's separateness on the dynamic level in comparison with the dimensional 
structure of space-time and the kinematic equivalence of masses: While spatial-temporal 
separateness shows only a certain oder  of connection, and masses appear equivalent in their 
singularity only 'under a kinematic aspect', the dynamic states of the field of force are 
dependent on one another in reality and constitute in this way a real, comprehensive unity of 
their multiplicity and diversity - precisely, indeed, a dynamic system. 
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5. System Formation and Organism 
17 The concept of field of force also implies that something like anraction and repulsion exist - 
Hegel hirnself attributes "repulsion" and "attraction" to mass in a basic sense, namely, in the 
sense connecting up with Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Natunvissenschafi in which 
matter possesses singular existence by repulsion, i.e., is exclusive toward other matter, and its 
intemal connection is guaranteed by attraction (9.60f, 62f add.). Hegel's argurnentation has its 
foundation in the logic of quantity (5.190ff). At this point I would like to let this rest and directly 
observe the empirical-physical side of the subject in order to pursue the question of how the 
principal tendency towards coherence and idealization in nature made valid by Hegel represents 
itself in this perspective: 
Quite generally, the conditions for the phenomena of attraction and repulsion are always 
given on the basis of fields of force. Together both make the formation of complex material 
18 
systems fundamentally possible, whereby these are understood as a - also temporally variable 
- real unity of structure of material elements. This is no longer merely an abstract order of 
connection, as stated in reference to time and space, or an equivalence relation as in the case of 
singular masses, and also not merely a system of dynamic states as in the case of the field of 
force: It is characteristic of all these forms of coherence that they are only implicitly realized, i.e, 
they must first be made visible through thought, as it were, e.g., in the form of a mathematical 
expression describing the field of force. It is characteristic of the realized coherence in material 
systems, on the other hand, that it now appears explicitly, i.e, in material form on its part. 
Without going into further detail I would like to turn to a class of material systems of 
special interest, namely, organisms. If we consult first Hegel's philosophy of nature on this, 
organisms are characterized by possessing the character of subject (9.337, 339ff add.), and for 
Hegel that means more precisely the stmcture of the concept (339 add.). The earthworm is, as it 
were. a concept which is winding its way through the soil. It is decisive for this viewpoint that 
the organism shows seif-preservution in the sense that it attempts to preserve itself actively as 
this kind of system, i.e., in its universality of species. The life process of the fly is also the 
continual striving for the prese~ation of the 'flyness' realized in it, exactly because the 
organism, Hegel argues, is in its essence something universal, which attempts to preserve itself 
as identical in its paaiculadies: and so, in fact, is precisely subject - something like a concept 
having become active. The concept, which, according to the objective-idealistic view, underlies 
the Being-of-nature in total, appears itself in the organism in real form, as it were; "what was 
merely perception up to now, has now come into existence'' (340 add.). "Here nature has thus 
reached the existence of the concept" (336 add.); "life is the concept that has attained its 
rnanifestation" (37 add.) 
It is important to see that thereby a new, higher status of the coherence of nature's 
separateness is reached: This coherence has just conceptual and thus already ideal character, 
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though still in the form of a material system. In Hegel's interpretation the organism is, as it 
were, an existing Ideal in material form. 
At this point we must ask to what extent empirical conditions of realization can, in fact, 
be given for this 'speculative' point of view. A basic answer is possible within the framework of 
System theory: An organism can only be a self-preserving system in this way if it contains an 
instance of control which controls and regulates the function of the system in the sense of self- 
19 preservation - and thus, as it were, is a representative of itself, a selj-instance. As we lmow 
today, these processes are ultimately determined by the gene information underlying the system. 
It represents the structural and functional plan of the system, thereby its 'norm' or universal and, 
in fact, in this manner has an ideal character. At the same time a determined identity is thereby 
actually defined, which becomes irnmediately clear in comparison with non-organic systems: 
The division of a pebble results in two pebbles; the division of a fly, by contrast, destroys it, 
precisely because the specific identity of its species, the universality of its species, is thereby 
20 destroyed. In a literai sense it is, therefore, an 'individual', 'indivisible'; this is the case 
because it is at the same time a univers~l. Hegel's interpretation of an organism as an existing 
concept is in this way, indeed, reconstructable in system theory and can thereby also be 
actualized in this sense. 
6. Evolution 
From the point of view of the tendency toward coherence and idealization of nature put forward 
by Hegel the organism has obviously progressed the furthest. Now, can this progression be 
understood as a result of an evolution of nature? Generaily, nature is, so Hegel argues, "to be 
seen as a system of levels, out of which one necessarily emerges from the other". However, this 
is not to say "that one is naturally bom of the other" (9.31); in other words: Hegel himself 
rejects the idea of a real evolution of the forms of nature, which for us at present is in no way to 
be doubted. This verdict is founded on the 'categorial' view of development already mentioned, 
according to which development concems only the 'concept', namely as making explicit that 
"which in itself is already there" (8.308 f add.), while in the sphere of being there exists only a 
transition into another. The only exception is the individual organism, precisely because, as 
already presented, it is to be understood as a real existing concept. According to Hegel, to 
assume a real development of species is, by contrast, ruled out. Thus, for him 'development' in 
reference to nature can always only have the character of a conceptual development of the 
categories of nature. 
21 In spite of this, I have shown in another analysis that right within the framework of 
Hegel's ontology of nature one can argue for a temporally-real process of upward graaiztion of 
nature, as I would like to express it, without needing Hegel's concept of development (in the 
sense of a conceptual development). In content we can designate this as 'evolution' as we 
understand it today. To outline this briefly (whereby I shall not consider cosmogonical 
processes): 
95 
BULLETIN OF THE HEGEL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN 
Under the supposition of a so-called 'abiotic' evolution (i.e., the origin of life from 
22 
anorganic matter ) a biotic evolution can take place, i.e., the formation of life out of life and, 
furthermore, the successive further development of life in nature. From an empincal-scientific 
point of view one can in principle argue in a 'Danvinistic' manner for such an evolution: 
'Mutations' in the genome can lead to advantages in the struggle for survival. These mutations 
can be inherited and, in the competition of individuals, can lead to the 'selection' of new 
varieties. This connection between mutation, selection and inheritance in principle offers a 
theoretically satisfying explanation for the empirically observed 'Origin of the Species' - so 
the title of Darwin's epoch-making book published in 1859 - which is at the same time a 
higher development in the sense of higher complexity and organization. 
23 Darwinian arguments for the pmess of upgrading can also be found by following this 
line of argumentation: Because land exists, land animals must arise out of aquatic animals (more 
exactly: on the basis of a population living first in water a selection pressure arises, which - in 
the long run - works in the direction of the development of land animals); because air exists, 
birds must also arise. In the long run, there arises a successive occupation of the potential 
environments already existing. Now, in analogy to that one can also argue for the idea of the 
generation of new environments: If there are singlecell organisms then mutiple-cell organisms 
can also arise; if there are plants, then herbivores can also arise; if there are herbivores, then 
carnivores can arise. In this way evolution itself brings forth environments: The condition just 
realized at the Same time forms the basis of new possibilities of life and in this sense we can in 
fact speak of an evolutionary process of upgrading. 
At the Same time it is clear that these new possibilities of life mean a More of complexity 
and, therefore, in principle demand more complex iiving beings. Let us look at the transition 
from plants to herbivores as an example: Plants are autotrophic, i.e., they can themselves 
produce organic substances from the dissolved material in the ground in which they are located. 
Animals, on the other hand, are heterotrophic, i.e., they need organic substances produced from 
other living beings - here plants. At first sight this seemingly unimportant condition has 
decisive consequences for the organization of animals (which, by the way, Hegel has already 
pointed out, cf. 9.1 350ff): Not only does it have to be equipped with a suitable Set of teeth to 
take in food, and - to pmess it further - with a complex digestive system; above all, it must 
first be able to find food. To do this it must be able to move and to onent itself in its 
environment. This demands an organization of senses, a nervous system and, basically, a central 
regulation- and control-instance, a brain, to process the sensory data as well as for the 
coordination and supewision of the vitally necessary activities, while plants are simply 
concemed with the biochemical regulation of their intemal functions. In other words: Anima1 
organization is necessarily more complex than that of plants, i.e., the evolutionary process of 
upgrading is simultaneously a step toward higher complm'ty. In this way, something new 
continually arises in 'the course of biological evolution - how is that to be understood 
ontologically conceming nature? 
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Let us look into the question of the new in an empincal-scientific way first of all: System 
theory has coined the concept of emergence for this phenomenon. Emergence explains the 
appearance of qualitatively new properties and, indeed, by system formation. This is to be 
understood as a holistic phenomenon: Emergent properties are system properties, which are part 
of the system as a whole and, therefore, can be completely new in comparison with the 
24 properties of the partial Systems. On the other hand, through emergence there obviously oniy 
appears something that was already contained in the Being-of-nature as apossibility: This is still 
hidden in elemental matter, but through system formation the possibilities lying in it come to 
light. That is no mystical phenomenon but a direct consequence of the fact that matter is subject 
to laws of nature: Of course, system formation is nothing other than a working together of 
elemental laws of nature to form more complex laws, namely, laws of system, which thus can 
lead to the emergence of qualitative new phenomena. Cosmogony, biological evolution, but 
also, for example, technology in this respect offer rich material for illustration: Supernovae, ants 
and lasers are examples of the fact that the Being-of-nature is not limited to primitive forms of 
appearance, but contains essentially possibility, which has its origin in laws of nature and comes 
to light in the phenomenon of emergence. 
This dimension of possibiiity connected with the Being-of-nature is thereby of decisive 
importance for the understanding of system formation, evolution, emergence and naturally 
technology, too. Its origin is to be found in laws of nature. The fertility of Hegel's concept of 
nature thus is demonstrated once again: Of course, according to objective-idealistic 
interpretation, laws of nature are in this way the expression of the logic underlying nature. The 
central presupposition of every theory of evolution will rest, from this point of view, oniy on the 
fact that nature does not amount to nothing more than its factual being but contains possibility 
which comes into appearance in the process of evolution, i.e., 'emerges'. 
A convincing ontological founding of, e.g., the theory of evolution is only possible in 
this way within the framework of an objective-idealistic ontology of nature, even if Hegel 
himself, as already stated, rejects the supposition of a real evolutionary process. In spite of this 
antiquated rejection of evolutionary thought his conception is of an eminent explanatory value in 
an ontological respect. 
7. The Emergence of the Psycbic in Nature 
The emergence of the psychic finally shows us what rich possibilities are available in the Being- 
of-nature. For purposes of clarification I shall first take up the line of argumentation developed 
in the system-theoretical interpretation and then show that Hegel's interpretation of Sensation 
can be reconstructed from the Same perspective, too. First of all, I shall connect up with what 
has previously been said as well as with my own analyses and briefly summarize their 
argumentation: Organisms have, as already mentioned, the character of a subject in the sense of 
a self-preserving Universal in the process of life. From the point of view of system theory this 
means, as already indicated, that there exists something like a control instance which controls 
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and regulates the self-presemation of the organism or expressed with a traditional concept, a t 
self-instance or Sei$ Now, this is the case with both plants and animals, but with a different 
structure: For the autotrophic plant it is onfy a matter of the self-regulation of biochemical 
functions; in this sense I would like to speak of a functional selJ: In addition to that, the 
heterotrophic animal must - on the basis of neural and sensual organization - also perform the 
control and coordination of actions and accordingly possesses not only a functional self but also 
an actional self, as I call it. Consequently, in the perspective of system theory such a double 
structure of a functional self and an actional self is characteristic of the animal subject. 
Such a 'doubled self is also held to be true by Hegel as well, remarkably enough. In 
contrast to plants, Hegel says, a "doubling of subjectivity" in its "unity" is characteristic of the 
animal (9.430 add.), a "self-self' (432 add.), that means a "self that exists for the self' (430 add., 
also 432 add., 465 add.); in other words: The self has "itself as its object" (432 add.). This 
"Finding-of-rhe-self-in-itseZj" of the subject is, according to Hegel, "sensation" (342 add., italics 
by D. W., also 432 add.). . 
However, the subjective double structure itself thus underlying the sensation is not 
proved more closely by Hegel. In the system-theoretical reconstmction, on the other hand, it is 
directly evident; in this way the structure of sensation is also comprehensible through system- 
theoretical considerations: It is obviously essential for the characterized duality of the functional 
and actional self that both cooperate for the self-presemation of the organism. The functional 
self thereby stands for the state of needs of the organism, which the norm also prescribes to the 
activity of regulation of the actional self. This is especially true for perception by the actional 
self, which is thereby always oriented toward 'two sides': On the one hand, it is perception of 
the outward but, on the other hand, it must always contain perception of the self, as well, i.e., 
perception of the organism's own condition. For instance, the perception of temperature at the 
sarne time contains infomation conceming to what extent the sensed temperature is comfortable 
for the organism itself; or by feeling an object I feel myself at the same time (cf. 9.466 add.). 
Anima1 perception thus basically includes a subjective element - indeed, increasingly with the 
higher stages of development; it is a subjectivized perception and thereby a finding of itself in 
itself of the subject or sensation, the elementary form of the psychic in nature. 
Characteristic qualities of the psychic, such as its placelessness (9.431 add.), inwarhess 
(9.377 add., also 10.20 add.), self-identity ('Being-for-self) (9.430 add., 10.97 add.) and ideality 
(9.465 add.), to which Hegel also calls ow attention, are also explained within the framework of 
the system-theoretical model: When the psychic, as presented, constitutes itself in the fusion of 
external perception and intemal perception of self, it cannot be localized at a specific place of 
the body, but is equally present in all sensations; the placelessness of the psychic is really its 
omnipresence as the same simple subjectivity in the multiplicity and diversity of sensations. 
That means, furthmore, that in the performance of extemal perception, at the same time, a 
subjective internal horizon of perception is spread out, a private sphere of 'inwardness' only 
accessible to the subject itself. And finally: In this inwardness the subject is, in the diversity of 
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sensations, continually in itself; it not only doesn't lose itself in the changing sensations and 
presemes its identity therein, but also has the sensation of this identity, thus identity for itself, 
self-identity. 
Placelessness, inwardness and self-identity are, however, only different sides of one and 
the same fact, which, according to Hegel, can be characterized totally with the concept of 
ideality. In the changing sensations the same subjectivity is always contained: a feature they 
have in comrnon, a universal. Thus, sensations have, as it were, conceptual status, and so indeed 
the character of ideality (16.87f. 9.432 add.). 
In this way, I think, a system-theoretical reconstruction of Hegel's interpretation of 
sensation is possible and thereby an empirical-scientific concretization of Hegel's conception. 
The psychic is thus explicable as a phenomenon of emergence, and, at the same time, the 
tendency towards idealization in nature appears, at this point, with maximum clarity: In the 
placelessness, inwardness, self-identity and thereby the ideality of psychic being, as well, it is 
obvious that the Being-of-nature does not amount to nothing more than du11 materiality but in 
fact always contains the possibility of idealiry. 
If the psychic in this sense is reconstructed as an emergent phenomenon of matter, this is 
in no way to be seen as an argument for a materialistic interpretation. Let us once again visualize 
the connection of arguments: For emergence-theoretical argumentation it is essential that matter 
is determined by laws of nature; only in this way can system formation exist and so organic 
Systems and especially animal structures of organization with perception, self-perception, and 
sensation. However, laws of nature that determine the behaviour of matter are for their part - as 
logical-conceptual structures - of irnmaterial nature. In this respect matter itself has 
transcended materialism, as it were, which cannot itself explain the existence of laws of nature. 
This can only be expected of an objective-idealistic concept of nature. The fact that nature 
brings forth the psychic besides, i.e., a form of ideal being, is not surprising in this perspective 
and confirms the relevance of an objective-idealistic ontology of nature. 
8. Possibilities of Actuaiiing Hegel's Philosophy of nature 
In its reconstructive interpretation Hegel's philosophy of nature conveys an impressive total 
picture of nature: a conrinuous connecrion of natural phenomena in the form of a gradual 
succession which shows a tendency toward increasing coherence and ideality - from 
elementary separateness to the ideality of the psychic. Hegel's concept of nature is thus worlds 
apart from Decartes', who conceived nature as pure extension and thereby as the strict contrary 
of the psychic. According to Hegel's conception, the Being-of-nature, as emphasized, does not 
amount to nothing more than the factualness of material matter, but fundamentally contains 
possibility, especially the possibility of the psychic, which in this way no longer appears as a 
secluded beyond of the physical. This character of an essential univ of nature makes this picture 
of nature so fascinating - a picture which thereby presents itself as an attractive, up-to-date 
alternative to the Cartesian conception. 
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Materialism, or in scientific vocabulary, physicalism, also has such a unified picture of 
nature in rnind. Yet one grave difference becomes clear here: These positions are, as already 
mentioned, of a limited range conceming the philosophy of nature, because they do not have an 
adequate ontology of nature at their disposal; for they are not in the position to explain laws of 
nature which, on their part, they must necessarily assume. This only becomes possible within the 
framework of an objective-idealistic ontology of nature, which offers good reasons on its part. 
First of all, the possibility of an a pnon development of the categones of nature is 
essential for this, which, according to an objective-idealistic understanding, makes the logic 
underlying the Being-of-nature comprehensible. Hegel himself assumes that such a development 
25 
of categones is feasible in pnnciple. It cannot be maintained, however, that this pretension is 
generally fulfilled by Hegel's text, even if Hegel's accomplishments eam admiration. 
in addition, as was pointed out in the introduction, such argumentation - even if it had 
really been carried out - obviously always has to be complemented by arguments in reference 
to the conditions of realization of natural phenomena: In so far as they belong to the real world, 
the aspect of the possibility of realization cannot be shaded out absolutely, and in this sense the 
inclusion of empirical-scientific arguments becomes unavoidable. This point of view aiready 
formulated at the beginning has been illustrated, for instance, by the system-theoretical 
considerations presented. Hegel himself offers an example for this: He explains sensation, as has 
been shown, by the self-self-structure of animal subjectivity without, however, proving the 
double structure peculiar to it. At the Same time, even he already points out the empirical 
conditions for animal existence (auto-motion, continual food intake, nervous System, etc., cf 
9.S350ff). The system-thwretical considerations developed here take up this line of 
argumentation and continue it consistently. 
In fact, it is also of philosophical interest to clarify, if at all, to what extent and in what 
manner this 'self-self-structure' is possible in realify and what consequences result from it. One 
of these consequences is the system-thwretical possibility of reconstruction of sensation, or, 
expressed more generally: the evidence of the emergence of the psychic out of the physical. In 
fact, only this confirmation can really serve as an answer to the philosophical question posed by 
the mind-body-problem; everything else would remain - as it is - merely assurance. To this 
extent, it appears to me that Hegel's argumentation concerning the philosophy of nature not only 
allows an actuaiization in the sense of the empincal conditions of realization, but also needs 
such an actualization. The argumentation of philosophy of nature not only can integrate 
empincal-scientific views but, indeed, must integrate them. 
On the other hand, and I thereby return to the starting-point of these methological 
considerations: If the transition from the physical to the psychic level of being is explained as a 
phenomenon of emergence, then certain questions become pressing: How can the psychic 
emerge or 'arise' on the basis of the physical? Where does it come from? 1s it already 
'contained' in the physical and, if so, in what form? Questions of this type, as already 
emphasized, can only be answered within the framework of a Hegelian type of ontology of 
BULLETIN OF THE HEGEL SOCIETY OF GREAT BRITAIN 
nature, according to which the h ing  underlying physical being is of ideal nature and thus in 
essential affinity to psychical being. Only under this condition is empincal system-theoretical 
argumentation adaptable to philosophy of nature. In this sense the empincal arguments require 
an idealistic-ontological foundation by themselves. A form of actualization of the Hegelian 
philosophy of nature is thereby given, which complements the one previously stated: Within the 
framework of an objective-idealistic ontology of nature empirical arguments can be 
ontologically founded, and in this manner, and only in this manner, can they be integrated into a 
total picture of nature. 
Seen in total, the considerations developed, as already anticipated in the introduction, 
result in possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature in a twofold respect: first of all, 
as an empirical-scientific concretization of Hegelian arguments, i.e., with respect to the 
conditions of reaiization of the sarne; secondly, in the sense of an ontological founding of 
empincal-scientific argumentation on the basis of an objective-ideaiistic ontology of nature. In 
this mutual crossing-over and elucidation of scientific and ideaiistic-ontological trains of thought 
conceming nature, in total, an astonishing actuaiity of Hegel's philosophy of nature becomes 
recognizable, not only in single points but, above all, in principle, too, i.e., in the sense of a 
contemporary concept of nature. 
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